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Corporate board is one of the most important corporate governance mechanisms that 
monitor and advise management in carrying responsibilities to protect shareholder 
interests. However, the relationship between board of directors and firm performance 
was still much debated. This study was carried out in order to seek the relationship 
between board characteristics and firm performance in companies listed on ACE Market 
at Bursa Malaysia. The data for a year; 2011 for 89 companies was collected from the 
annual report and the Data Stream. The dependent variables were Tobin’s q and return 
on assets (ROA) while the independent variables were board size, CEO ownership, 
independent directors, firm size, and firm age. The result of multiple regression model 
and correlation showed that board size has a negative relationship with Tobin’s Q but a 
positive relationship with the ROA. CEO ownership shows a negative relationship with 
Tobin’s Q and positive relationship with ROA. Director independence has negative 
relationships with both Tobin’s Q and ROA. Results for the firm size show a negative 
relationship with Tobin’s Q and a positive one with ROA while firm age indicate 
positive relationships for both Tobin’s Q and ROA. Of the independent variables, only 
firm size has a significant relationship with both Tobin’s Q and ROA while CEO 
ownership shows a significant relationship with ROA. 
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Lembaga korporat merupakan salah satu mekanisme urustadbir korporat yang penting 
dalam memantau dan memberi nasihat kepada pihak pengurusan untuk menjalankan 
tanggungjawab untuk melindungi kepentingan pemegang saham. Walau bagaimanapun, 
hubungan antara lembaga pengarah dan prestasi firma masih dibahaskan. Kajian ini 
dijalankan untuk mengkaji hubungan antara ciri-ciri lembaga pengarah dan prestasi 
firma untuk syarikat-syarikat yang disenaraikan di ACE Market di dalam Bursa 
Malaysia. Data untuk tahun 2011 bagi 89 syarikat yang tersenarai di ‘ACE Market’ telah 
dikumpulkan dari laporan tahunan setiap syarikat dan ‘Data Stream’. Pembolehubah 
bersandar yang digunakan dalam kajian ini adalah ‘Tobin’s q’ dan pulangan atas asset 
(ROA) sebagai prestasi syarikat. Manakala, pembolehubah tidak bersandar adalah saiz 
lembaga pengarah, pemilikan saham oleh Ketua Pegawai Eksekutif, saiz syarikat dan 
umur syarikat. Hasil daripada kajian dan analisis yang telah dijalankan, saiz lembaga 
pengarah menunjukkan hubungan yang negatif terhadap ‘Tobin’s q’ manakala hubungan 
terhadap pulangan atas asset (ROA) adalah positif. Pemilikan ketua pegarah eksekutif 
(CEO) pula hanya menunjukkan hubungan yang positif terhadap pulangan atas asset 
(ROA) manakala hubungan dengan ‘Tobin’s q’ adalah negatif. Kajian juga 
menunjukkan bahawa terdapat hubungan negatif di antara pengarah bebas di dalam 
lembaga pengarah terhadap pulangan atas asset (ROA) dan ‘Tobin’s q’. Saiz syarikat 
berkait secara negatif dengan ‘Tobin’s q’ tetapi berkait secara positif dengan pulangan 
atas asset (ROA). Untuk hubungan antara umur syarikat terhadap prestasi syarikat pula, 
kajian menunujukkan hubungan yang positif untuk ‘Tobin’s q’ dan pulangan atas asset 
(ROA). Di antara kesemua pembolehubah tidak bersandar, hanya saiz firma yang 
mempunyai hubungan yang signifikan dengan kedua-dua Tobin’s Q dan ROA manakala 
CEO menunjukkan hubungan yang signifikan dengan ROA.  
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1.1 CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
In corporate governance today, the reforms of board of director are being more stressed 
on. East Asian financial crisis of 1997, the world famous corporate scandals in Enron, 
WorldCom, Tyco International in U.S.A, HIH Insurance in Australia, Pramalat in Italy 
and Air New Zealand showed the importance of corporate governance. All the scandals 
were resulted from the lack and ineffectiveness of the monitoring mechanisms and 
governance practices. It also included with the failure of the Board of Directors (BOD) 
(Ranasinghe, 2010).     
 
After the financial crisis on 1997, most Asian countries also prepared their corporate 
governance transparency and disclosure levels better (Shamsul Nahar, 2006), and so did 
Malaysia. According to Malaysian Code on Corporate Governance 2012, the 1997/98 
Asian Financial Crisis had affected investor confidence on Malaysia. Since then policy 
makers had raised the standards of corporate governance. This was brought forward by 
the issuance of the Malaysia Code on Corporate Governance (Code) in 2000.  
 
Corporate governance determination:  
The process and structure used to direct and manage the business and affairs of the 
company towards enhancing business prosperity and corporate accountability with the 
ultimate objective of realizing long-term shareholder value, whilst taking into account 
the interests of other stakeholders. (Malaysian Code of Corporate Governance 2012) 
The contents of 
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